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BGS (2019) show that the interaction between memory and attention unifies many effects studied in behavioral economics, ranging from experience effects, to projection bias, to inattention, to reference effects. Here we revisit the SL evidence in light of that model. Besides generating the basic SL findings, our model yields two new predictions, which we test and confirm using 20 additional years of data.
I. The Model
We consider the mover's willingness to pay for a rental of quality . This mover receives offers drawn from the city's rent distribution for , and accepts rents below his willingness to pay. By shaping the willingness to pay, the memory-based reference rent shapes the average rent paid by the consumer for . .
A. Associative Memory
Suppose that the average rent in the destination city is ! , that in the origin city is ! . The memory database is described by a distribution over these rents ! , ! where ! ∈ 0,1 is the frequency with which ! has been experienced by time . A higher ! is either due to the fact that the mover has stayed longer in the destination city or because he has lived in cities with similar rents in the past.
Upon observing rent at time , the mover recalls similar prices from the database. In this recall, he overweighs rents similar to , where similarity with a rent ′ is measured by the function − ′ , where . is decreasing in distance. Cued by the destination city rent ! , the memory based rent norm is thus the similarity weighted average of past experienced rents (see Kahana 2012) .
(1) 
B. Salience and Valuation
As the mover retrieves the norm ! , he values a rental according to the salience distorted valuation: 
C. Predictions
Equations (1) and (2) yield several predictions about !"# (proofs available in Web Appendix).
Prediction 1 (Anchoring). WTP increases in
! , that is
The rent paid on average after moving to the destination city increases in the rent level in the city of origin.
Higher ! increases the price norm ! .
By comparison, any given local rent seems relatively more attractive, which increases the mover's willingness to pay.
Prediction 2 (Adaptation from experience).
If the household moves again in the destination city, the rent paid subsequently depends less on the city of origin:
By the time he rents again, the mover has greater experience ! with local rents. Thus, his norm is more adapted to the local rent (for ! = 1 the mover's rental choice no longer depends on ! ). In our setting, this is identical to Prediction 2 because we assume that living long ago in a city with rent ! affects norms similarly to living in the destination city. This is akin to having greater experience ! with ! . Due to similarity, these rents are recalled even if experienced long in the past, which increases adaptation to the current rent, reducing the influence of the rent in the city of origin ! .
Prediction 4 (Asymmetry). Rent in city of
origin has a stronger effect on rent paid for movers to cheaper cities than for movers to more expensive cities, namely:
Formally, the coefficient on city of origin rent should be higher for movers coming from more expensive cities than for movers to more expensive cities. This last prediction highlights a distinctive decoy effect property of salience: in expensive cities where ! is high, any given price difference is less salient, reducing anchoring to past rents. Loss aversion would predict the opposite effect.
II. Empirical Tests
We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a longitudinal yearly survey on a representative sample of U.S. families. PSID data on housing history is now available from 1983 to 2013, roughly tripling the SL sample (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) To test predictions 1 to 4 we follow closely SL's approach. Consider a household that moves in survey year and is a renter after the move. We take his post-move rent at year , denoted !" , as a proxy for his unobserved !"#$% . We then run regressions of the form:
Let !,! ! and !,! denote the median rents in the mover's cities of origin and destination, respectively. While rent levels in the current city are measured in the year of the move, , rent levels in the city of origin are measured the last year the household lived there.
1
The analysis uses the PSID's Sensitive Data Files. We obtained access to this data under contractual arrangements designed to protect the anonymity of respondents. PSID did not collect data on rent paid during the years 1988 and 1999, so these years are excluded from the analysis. Following SL, we focus on households observed for at least five survey waves and who move cities at least once. Additional information on our data analysis is available upon request. There are two related econometric concerns: rental quality must be held constant and we must address heterogeneity of households.
Like SL, we control for housing quality and household heterogeneity by including in our regressions several controls available in the PSID: household income, family composition, and age and education of head of household.
We also control for whether the household previously rented or owned, and for a measure of relative taste for housing, the ratio !,! ! / !,! ! of their rent expenditure to the median rent in the city of origin for past renters, and the analogous ratio in terms of house prices for past owners. We also include year fixed effects and a Heckman correction to account for endogenous sorting into renting, as opposed to buying.
We test prediction 1 using all observations of households in the year they move across cities. To test prediction 2 we consider households whom we observe moving within a city after having moved between cities. To test prediction 3 on adaptation through pricesimilarity, we focus on movers for whom we observe two moves across three cities. We measure rent similarity between the earlier city and destination city by the absolute difference in median rent ! − !"#$%!# . We then divide these movers into households for whom price similarity between destination and earlier cities is higher or lower than the median in this sample, and run the regression separately for each group. Finally, we test prediction 4 on asymmetry by dividing the baseline sample (used in Prediction 1) into households who moved to more expensive versus cheaper cities. Table 1 The results of Table 1 are robust to different specifications. Controlling for endogenous selection into renting or for taste for housing, or excluding households who move for housing related reasons, plays essentially no role. Restricting the sample to households who rented before the move has little effect, except for prediction 3: the results remain directionally consistent, but the effect on households who experienced dissimilar prices is no longer significant, perhaps due to the much smaller sample size. SL test a version of Prediction 4 and find no asymmetry in their shorter sample.
III. Conclusion
The interaction between memory and attention yields reference effects that shed light on observed housing choices of movers.
The reference price, or norm, is not rational but is formed using past experiences. Indeed, rational expectations reference points would counterfactually imply immediate adaptation upon learning destination city level of rents.
The memory based price norm also differs from a mechanical "backward looking" one because it adjusts through similarity. Because our reference point is situation-specific, adaptation is fast if similar experiences were had even in remote past. 
